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Summary
A combination of intensified international pressure and deadlines associated with
Euro-Atlantic integration processes has prompted a spate of transfers of persons indicted
for war crimes to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
in The Hague in late 2004-early 2005.  Full cooperation with The Hague tribunal has
been established as a key prerequisite to further progress toward a shared long-term goal
for the western Balkan countries: closer association with and eventual membership in
the European Union (EU) and NATO.  The Euro-integration efforts of Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro have stalled (to varying degrees) over ICTY
cooperation, although recent evidence of progress in turning over indicted persons may
prompt further consideration.  Limited cooperation with ICTY has also held up some
U.S. bilateral assistance to Serbia.  Some top-ranking war crimes suspects remain at
large; meanwhile, the Tribunal is preparing to wind down its operations and has issued
its final indictments. This report will be updated as events warrant.  See also CRS
Report RS21686, Conditions on U.S. Aid to Serbia. 
Introduction and U.S. Concerns
In the first few months of 2005, a steady stream of individuals charged with Balkan
war crimes has turned up at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in The Hague.  Factors contributing to this recent inflow include intensified
international pressure and upcoming deadlines associated with the European integration
process.  The European Union (EU) and NATO have explicitly conditioned closer
association with the western Balkan states (mainly Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and also Croatia) on their respective levels of cooperation with ICTY.  To
varying degrees, conditionality policy has held up Euro-integration processes in the
western Balkans that would otherwise likely have gone forward.  In addition, in early
2005, the United States suspended some bilateral assistance programs to Serbia as a result
of Belgrade’s limited cooperation with ICTY.
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1 For more on the status of ICTY’s completion strategy, see addresses by ICTY Prosecutor Carla
del Ponte and President Judge Theodor Meron to the U.N. Security Council, Nov. 23, 2004
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Most of the recent transfers of indicted persons have come from Serbia or the
Republika Srpska (RS) entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina, both parties with the
greatest number of suspects and the weakest cumulative record of cooperation with ICTY.
Other prominent surrenders include the former Prime Minister of Kosovo’s governing
institutions and the former Bosnian Muslim (or Bosniak) Army chief.  Even with the
recent improvements in cooperation, some problems persist.  For example, Serbia’s
government led by Prime Minister Kostunica has refused to arrest indicted suspects, but
instead has encouraged their voluntary surrender.  The Tribunal remains a deeply
unpopular institution in the eyes of the Serbian (and, increasingly, the Croatian)
populations.  Many of the recently transferred suspects have been sent off to The Hague
as national heroes.  Moreover, the fate of top-ranking remaining war crimes suspects,
some of whom have eluded capture for a decade, remains uncertain.
Meanwhile, ICTY operations are beginning to wind down after a dozen years in
operation.  Current plans call for all ICTY court proceedings to finish by 2010, a timetable
at risk if the top suspects remaining at large are not soon turned over.1  ICTY Chief
Prosecutor Carla del Ponte prepared the Tribunal’s final indictments in late 2004 and the
last indictments were unsealed and made public in March 2005.  More than 50 accused
are currently in ICTY’s custody.
U.S. Administration and congressional interest in levels of Balkan cooperation with
the Tribunal stems from longstanding U.S. support for ICTY and insistence that the top-
ranking indicted persons be turned over to The Hague. The United States supports the
region’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including closer ties to and possible membership in
NATO.  In legislation, Congress has annually conditioned U.S. assistance to Serbia on
ICTY cooperation, including the extradition of Gen. Mladic. The Bush Administration
also supports the Tribunal’s “completion strategy” to conclude activities by 2010.
Summary of Recent Transfers
Since late 2004, over a dozen persons indicted for war crimes have been transferred
to The Hague from Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia.  A reverse chronology of recent arrivals
to the ICTY detention unit follows.2
03/24/2005 — Former Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski was transferred
to The Hague from Croatia, where he had been incarcerated on charges unrelated to
the ICTY indictment.  His ICTY indictment cites charges relating to the unlawful
killing of ethnic Albanian civilians in northern Macedonia during the 2001 conflict.
03/23/2005 — Former Bosnian Serb General Vinko Pandurevic was transferred to
The Hague. Gen.  Pandurevic served as a brigade commander of the Bosnian Serb
Army (VRS).  His indictment for genocide and crimes against humanity relates to the
1995 massacre in Srebrenica.
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3 Jankovic was reportedly one of several Serbian indictees who had sought and received refuge
in Russia for years.  See Ed Vulliamy, “Russians accused of sheltering war crimes suspects,” The
Guardian (U.K.), Mar. 15, 2005.
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03/17/ 2005 — Former Bosnian Serb Chief of Security Drago Nikolic arrived at The
Hague.  Nikolic is charged with genocide and crimes against humanity for his alleged
individual criminal role in the 1995 Srebrenica assault.
03/16/2005 — Former Macedonian police officer Johan Tarculovski arrived at The
Hague. Along with former Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski,
Tarculovski is charged with unlawful attacks on civilians during the 2001 inter-ethnic
conflict in Macedonia. 
03/14/2005 — Former Bosnian Serb Chief of Police Gojko Jankovic was transferred
to The Hague from Banja Luka.3 He is charged with war crimes allegedly committed
in the 1992 attack on the Bosnian town of Foca. 
03/11/2005 — Former Bosnian Serb Interior Minister (MUP) Mico Stanisic was
transferred to The Hague. He is charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity
relating to his role in commanding and directing Bosnian Serb police actions against
non-Serb populations in Bosnia during 1992. 
03/09/2005 — Ramush Haradinaj was handed over to The Hague after resigning from
his position as Kosovo Prime Minister the previous day.4  The indictment against
former Kosovo Liberation Army commander Haradinaj and two of his subordinates
(Lahi Brahimaj and Idriz Balaj, who turned themselves in with Haradinaj) cites
charges of war crimes perpetrated against Serbs, other minorities, and Albanians in
Kosovo in 1998.
03/07/2005 — Gen. Momcilo Perisic, former Chief of the General Staff of the
Yugoslav Army, surrendered to The Hague.  He is charged with 13 counts of crimes
allegedly committed in Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Srebrenica.  His indictment is for
individual criminal responsibility and command authority over the Yugoslav Army.
03/01/2005 — Gen. Radivoj Miletic, former Bosnian Serb army chief of operations,
arrived at The Hague after surrendering to Serbian government authorities.  His
indictment, shared with Milan Gvero (below), relates to war crimes allegedly
committed in Srebrenica in 1995. 
02/28/2005 — Gen. Rasim Delic, former Chief of the General Staff of the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, departed Sarajevo for The Hague.  He is charged on the
basis of his command authority with four counts of violating customs of war in 1993
and 1995.
02/21/2005 — Milan Gvero, a former VRS commander, arrived at The Hague from
Belgrade.  He is charged with individual criminal responsibility for crimes allegedly
committed in the Srebrenica region in 1995.
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02/03/2005 — Gen. Vladimir Lazarevic, former commander of the Yugoslav Army
Pristina Corps, arrived at The Hague.  Lazarevic is one of the four Yugoslav Army
generals indicted by ICTY in October 2003 for alleged crimes committed in Kosovo
in 1999.
Remaining Suspects at Large
By late March 2005, over one dozen indicted suspects remained at large.  For most
concerned parties, the short list comprises the top three suspects: former Bosnian Serb
leaders Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic; and former Croatian Gen. Ante
Gotovina.  The indictments against Karadzic and Mladic charge the former Bosnian Serb
leaders with genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of
war as part of the Bosnian Serb campaign in 1991 to 1995 to control territory and drive
out non-Serb populations.  Gotovina is charged with crimes against humanity and
violations of the laws or customs of war in relation to the 1995 Croatian “Storm”
offensive against Croatian Serb-held territory in the Krajina region.  
Authorities in Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Zagreb insist they do not know the
whereabouts of these suspects; ICTY and other international officials believe that local
governments can do more than they have to bring about their arrest and capture, especially
by going after their support networks.  For example, ICTY Chief Prosecutor del Ponte has
charged that Gen. Gotovina was “within reach” of Croatia’s authorities and was allegedly
spotted in the country as recently as mid-2004.  She has also claimed that Belgrade has
had knowledge about Gen. Mladic’s whereabouts.  Similarly, the Office of the High
Representative in Bosnia has charged that some authorities in the Republika Srpska had
supported and sheltered Gen. Mladic as recently as mid-2004.
Other priority suspects include the remaining former Yugoslav military generals
under the October 2003 indictment, including former Serbian police and army generals
Sreten Lukic and Nebojsa Pavkovic, both thought to be residing in Serbia.  A third
Serbian general under the same indictment, Vlastimir Djordjevic, is thought to be hiding
in Russia.  By late March, Serbian officials predicted that Generals Lukic and Pavkovic
would very soon agree to surrender. 
Policy Implications
By early 2005, the implications of the established international conditionality policy
had become more pronounced, as international actors such as the European Union, United
States, and Office of the High Representative in Bosnia wielded “carrot and stick”
instruments more explicitly.  Securing the region in a stable and prosperous Euro-Atlantic
zone, as opposed to an area of incomplete postwar transition susceptible to destabilizing
trends or criminal elements, remains a shared goal.  On the incentive side, officials have
expressed continued support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the western Balkan states
and a strong interest in moving forward in these integration processes, some of which
have lagged primarily over ICTY cooperation.  At the same time, recent actions have
made clear that these processes cannot be completed until the Balkan states adhere to
standards on international commitments and the rule of law, especially with regard to
meeting obligations on ICTY cooperation and overcoming the legacy of the wartime
years.  Still lagging behind other nations in the integration process, the western Balkan
states have made closer ties to NATO and especially the EU a key strategic priority. 
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5 Beyond the issue of extradition, a recent achievement in Bosnia was the inauguration in March
2005 of the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is
expected eventually to take over for ICTY prosecution of war crimes in Bosnia.
Invoking ICTY cooperation as a roadblock to further progress in European
integration was most recently demonstrated with the EU’s decision to postpone
membership talks with Croatia (see below).  Other prominent examples include NATO’s
decisions in 2004 not to invite Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro to join Partnership for
Peace, and High Representative Paddy Ashdown’s subsequent measures to remove
obstructionist Bosnian Serb leaders from office.  Another related example was the U.S.
decision in January to withhold a portion of FY2005 bilateral assistance to Serbia because
of Belgrade’s poor cooperation with ICTY.  
Leaders in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia have acknowledged the necessity of
demonstrating full cooperation with ICTY in order to remove this hurdle to achieving
their Euro-Atlantic goals, even if they disagree on methods to demonstrate such
cooperation.  As mentioned earlier, increased awareness of the policy consequences of
incomplete cooperation has prompted the recent upswing in transfers of suspects as well
as moves to freeze their financial assets.  Other policy implications are outlined below.
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Like Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina
currently seeks membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and a Stabilization
and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union.  The EU concluded an SAA
Feasibility Study for Bosnia in November 2003 and identified 16 priority reform areas
that have become a blueprint for Bosnia’s ongoing reform process.  At the same time,
limited cooperation with ICTY especially by the Republika Srpska has caused a
slowdown in the association process.  Until January 2005, RS authorities had not turned
over a single indicted suspect.  The ICTY issue has also provided High Representative
Paddy Ashdown justification for exercising his authority to remove obstructionist
officials, freeze assets, and even re-shape governing institutions especially in the defense
and security sectors, segments of which were thought to support war crimes fugitives.
Bosnia’s authorities are seeking to demonstrate improved cooperation before May 2005,
when the EU is expected to consider opening SAA negotiations with Bosnia.5 The status
of Radovan Karadzic will remain a key challenge for Bosnia’s authorities as well as for
the EU military force and residual NATO presence in Bosnia, whose mandates include
apprehending persons indicted for war crimes.
Croatia.  With one major exception, largely positive assessments of Croatian
government cooperation on war crimes issues — as well as considerable advancement in
economic and institutional reforms — have enabled Croatia to progress steadily in the EU
integration process. Croatia signed an EU Stabilization and Association Agreement in
October 2001.  Croatia formally applied for EU membership in February 2003 and in June
2004, the EU named Croatia a candidate country for membership.  In December 2004, the
EU agreed to open accession negotiations with Croatia in March 2005 provided that
Croatia continued to cooperate with ICTY.  However, the unresolved status of Gen. Ante
Gotovina, who disappeared in June 2001 and represents the final obstacle to full
cooperation with ICTY, has had a negative impact on this timetable. 
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6 ICTY Prosecutor del Ponte reportedly stated to EU ministers that “until such time as (Gotovina)
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On March 16, 2005, European Union members decided to postpone indefinitely the
opening of accession negotiations with Croatia.  The EU is expected to continue to
investigate the matter and possibly re-examine its position on Croatia in coming months,
although some further resolution of the Gotovina situation will likely be required before
membership talks can begin.6 Meanwhile, the EU decision to postpone accession
negotiations sparked a swift popular Croatian backlash against the EU and a renewed
wave of support for Gotovina.  Polls show that a majority of the population opposes
Gotovina’s extradition and a move by the Sanader government to capture Gotovina could
imperil political stability.  Some analysts are concerned that popular resentment over the
Gotovina case could erode support for reforms essential for eventual EU integration.
Others note that Croatia is otherwise well positioned to join the EU relatively soon.
Serbia and Montenegro.  Despite Serbia’s notable achievement of extraditing
wartime Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague in 2001, assessments of
Serbia’s level of cooperation with ICTY remained largely negative until recently,
especially with respect to Belgrade’s willingness to deliver war crimes suspects to The
Hague.  Beginning in late 2004, the Kostunica government increased its efforts to
encourage the voluntary surrender of indicted persons, with evident results, even while
it has not abandoned its reluctance to making arrests. Politically, the Kostunica
government is constrained to some extent because it is supported in parliament by
Milosevic’s Socialist Party (SPS) and because the SPS and the nationalist Radical Party
(SRS) vehemently oppose cooperation with The Hague.  However, the extent of
Kostunica’s political vulnerability over ICTY cooperation is open to debate.
Serbia’s cooperation with ICTY has been a sore spot in its foreign relations for the
past few years.  In accordance with annual foreign aid appropriations legislation, the
United States  suspended portions of bilateral assistance to Serbia over war crimes issues
in FY2004 and FY2005.  In 2004, Serbia and Montenegro was twice denied entry into
Partnership for Peace despite significant progress in defense reforms.  Serbia and
Montenegro lags behind other western Balkan states in the EU’s Stabilization and
Association process, the precursor to closer EU association and targeted EU assistance.
Most observers believe that a projected EU timetable of March-April 2005 to finalize a
Feasibility Study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia and
Montenegro spurred Belgrade to demonstrate substantially improved ICTY cooperation.
Increased activity began in late 2004 when ICTY delivered its most recent negative
assessment of Serbia’s record of cooperation and after the EU again postponed movement
on the SAA Feasibility Study.7 Current reports speculate that the EU could decide
favorably on a Feasibility Study in April, provided that the two police and army generals
(Lukic and Pavkovic) known to remain in Serbia are turned over by then.  Serbian
officials have indicated that about 10 more suspects likely remain in Serbia, not including
Mladic. However, most observers also believe that Mladic’s status will ultimately need
to be resolved before Serbia’s leaders can put the ICTY obstacle fully behind them.
